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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellants Hill and Caldwell (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as H&C) listed several issues in their brief, but 
did not cite the standard for review as required by Rule 
24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Respondent State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter State 
Farm) submits the relevant issues on appeal with their 
appropriate standard of review, can be summarized as follows: 
1. Was the trial court's granting of summary judgment for 
State Farm correct because: 
a. Hill was not in privity of contract with State 
Farm, State Farm owed Hill no duty, and Hill, therefore, has no 
claim for bad faith or punitive damages; 
b. There is no basis for punitive damages because 
H&C alleged contractual, not tort, claims; and 
c. There was no first-party bad faith, as a matter 
of law, because the subrogation issue was fairly debatable. 
Standard of Review: No genuine issue of material fact and 
review trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Shire 
Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990); Pixton v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., P.2d , 158 U.A.R. 31 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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2. Did the trial court correctly deny H&C's motion to file 
an amended complaint? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Regional Sales 
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210 (Utah App. 1989). 
RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
1. Rule 56, U.R.C.P. 
2. Rule 15, U.R.C.P. 
Copies of these rules are attached as Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
in the Trial Court 
This case was filed on November 18, 1983. (Record on 
Appeal, hereinafter R., 2) Caldwell's automobile was insured 
with State Farm. (R. 2-3) Caldwell's son, Troy, and Hill's 
daughter, Tamara, were killed on June 6, 1982, when they were 
involved in an accident while riding together in Caldwell's car. 
The accident was with Kenneth Paul Bryan (hereinafter "Bryan"), 
who was driving a vehicle insured by Cumis Insurance Society 
(hereinafter "CUMIS"). (R. 2) 
State Farm paid Caldwell $5,510 for property damage to his 
vehicle under the collision coverage provision of Caldwell's 
insurance policy. (R. 174, Caldwell Depo., p. 11) 
H&C made wrongful death claims against CUMIS. CUMIS had a 
$50,000 single limit liability policy covering Bryan. (R. 4) 
State Farm notified CUMIS of its $5,510 property damage 
subrogation claim. (See R. 343) When CUMIS settled with H&C, 
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it issued a separate draft for $5,510 payable to Caldwell and 
State Farm, representing the property damage to Caldwell's car 
and paid the remainder of its $50,000 equally to H&C. (R. 174, 
Caldwell Depo., pp. 22-23, 25-26, 31 and Depo. Exh. 1; R. 175, 
Hill Depo., pp. 34-36) 
H&C sued State Farm for the $5,510, claiming it rightfully 
belonged to them and that State Farm acted in bad faith by 
refusing to waive its subrogation claim. (See R. 2-6) 
State Farm answered and counterclaimed against Caldwell for 
the $5,510. (R. 9-12, 52-59) 
Judge Billings, then a Third District Court Judge, granted 
summary judgment on October 22, 1984, in favor of State Farm, 
dismissing H&C's complaint and awarding State Farm a judgment 
against Caldwell of $6,393.11. (R. 135-37) Judge Billings also 
granted summary judgment in favor of Bryan on State Farm's 
third-party complaint. (IcL ) A copy of the Judgment is 
attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
H&C appealed Judge Billing's summary judgment to the Supreme 
Court on November 19, 1984. (R. 142) On November 1, 1988, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision reversing State Farm's summary 
judgment. (R. 206-210) Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). A copy of the decision is attached as 
Addendum 3. 
Following remittitur of the case, State Farm paid the $5,510 
plus interest to Caldwell. (R. 217, 347) State Farm moved for 
summary judgment on May 4, 1989, on all Hill's claims and 
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partial summary judgment on Caldwell's punitive damage claim. 
(R. 248-49) H&C responded, in part, by filing a motion for 
leave to file first amended complaint on June 16, 1989. (R. 
278-79) Judge David S. Young denied the motion to amend. (R. 
319-21) A copy of Judge Young's order is attached as Addendum 
4. Judge Young entered summary judgment for State Farm on all 
Hill's claims and on Caldwell's punitive damage claim on March 
26, 1990. (R. 346-49) A copy of the Judgment is attached as 
Addendum 5. 
On April 21, 1990, State Farm moved for summary judgment on 
Caldwell's remaining claim for bad faith. (R. 354-55) Caldwell 
filed no opposition to the motion. Judge Young entered judgment 
for State Farm on June 11, 1990. (R. 368-69) A copy of the 
Judgment is attached as Addendum 6. 
In the judgment entered March 26, 1990, Judge Young 
specifically ordered, inter alia, that following State Farm's 
payment of the $5,510 plus interest to Caldwell, the only 
remaining claims were for bad faith and punitive damages; that 
H&C's bad faith claims were first-party insurance contract bad 
faith claims; that no punitive damages can be recovered for 
first-party insurance bad faith claims; that H&C had alleged no 
independent tortious conduct; and that the issues raised by 
H&C's bad faith claims were and had been throughout the pendency 
of the action fairly debatable. (R. 347-48) In the judgment 
entered on June 11, 1990, Judge Young again found the issues 
raised by Caldwell's bad faith claim were and had been 
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throughout the pendency of the action fairly debatable. (R. 
368-69) 
B. Statement of Facts 
In addition to the facts set forth above, the following 
additional facts are relevant: 
Caldwell's insurance policy with State Farm included a 
subrogation provision applicable to collision coverage. It 
stated: 
Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy, . 
. . the company shall be subrogated to all the 
insured's rights of recovery therefor and the 
insured shall do whatever is necessary to 
secure such rights and do nothing to prejudice 
them. [R. 239] 
Collision coverage under the policy was for Caldwell!s 1979 
Honda 2-door automobile. (R. 228, 233-36) 
State Farm paid $6,5 39 in no-fault benefits for Caldwell and 
$6,120 in no-fault benefits for Hill. (R. 90-91) The no-fault 
payments included $5,000 for Hill and $5,000 for Caldwell in 
survivor benefits. (R. 228, 232, 233) State Farm waived any 
claim for reimbursement of no-fault benefits more than one year 
before H&C filed their complaint, which waiver was confirmed by 
letter to CUMIS dated August 9, 1982. (R. 343) A copy of this 
letter is attached as Addendum 7. Caldwell's prior attorney, 
Mr. Haslam, was notified of this waiver before H&C!s subsequent 
attorney, Mr. Lauchnor, was retained. (R. 340-41) 
In Hill v. State Farm, supra, the Supreme Court was required 
"to determine who is entitled to the settlement proceeds." 765 
5 
P.2d at 867. In that regard, the court concluded there were two 
issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment. 
First, whether H&C were fully compensated for their wrongful 
death claims without receiving the $5,510; and, second, whether 
State Farm's subrogation right was prejudiced by H&C's 
settlement with, and release of, Bryan. The court further held 
that if either of those issues were decided in favor of State 
Farm, then State Farm was entitled to the $5,510. There is 
nothing in the court's opinion which even remotely suggests 
State Farm acted in bad faith by asserting its subrogation 
right. 
H&C's brief contains several factual statements which State 
Farm submits are either inaccurate, or merely a statement of 
opinion. 
For example, on numerous occasions, H&C assert as a fact 
that CUMIS1 liability coverage was insufficient to cover the 
wrongful death claims. (See Appellants' Brief at 10-11, 16) 
Contrary to these assertions, the Supreme Court's opinion 
specifically held this to be a disputed issue of fact. 
H&C also assert as a fact that State Farm sought 
reimbursement of its no-fault benefits from CUMIS and that H&C 
were required to hire counsel to stop State Farm from pursuing 
this claim. (See Appellants' Brief at 10) In support of this 
statement, H&C cite their own depositions (without reference to 
any specific pages therein) and also the affidavit of 
Mr. Lauchnor. Review of that affidavit shows Lauchnor first met 
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H&C on February 1, 1983 (R. 272), almost six months after State 
Farm's letter to CUMIS waiving any claim for no-fault 
reimbursement. (R. 34 3) Lauchnor's affidavit contains several 
hearsay statements attributable to CUMIS which would not be 
admissible. The affidavit refers to Lauchnor's conversations 
with "State Farm's claims man" and "the claims manager for 
CUMIS" without identifying either person by name. 
H&C signed releases in favor of Bryan and others on March 
16, 1983. (R. 110-115) Both Hill's and Caldwell's releases 
specifically acknowledged there was a controversy concerning who 
was entitled to the $5,510. (R. Ill, 113) The releases also 
identified the $5,510 as payment for property damages to 
Caldwell's car. (See R. 110-115) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. There are no disputed issues of material fact, and State 
Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: 
a. After remand of the case by the Supreme Court, 
State Farm paid Caldwell the disputed subrogation moneys. The 
only remaining issues thereafter were bad faith and punitive 
damages, which could be decided as a matter of law. 
b. Hill's and Caldwell's bad faith claims are 
contractual first-party insurance bad faith claims. 
c. A first-party insurance bad faith claim can only 
be made by a person in privity of contract with the insurance 
company. 
7 
d. There was no privity of contract between Hill and 
State Farm with respect to State Farm's collision coverage 
payment to Caldwell and the subrogation claim arising therefrom. 
Therefore, State Farm owed Hill no duty, and Hill has no claim 
for bad faith or punitive damages. 
e. No punitive damages can be awarded for H&C's 
first-party bad faith claims because they are contract, not tort 
claims. H&C did not assert any independent tortious conduct 
against State Farm. 
f. There is no first-party bad faith, as a matter of 
law, because the issues concerning entitlement to the $5,510 and 
State Farm's right to assert its subrogation claim are fairly 
debatable. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
H&C's motion to amend complaint because it was made too late in 
the course of the litigation without justification, was 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision, asserted wholly 
new claims, and was designed to create a punitive damages case 
where none existed. 
3. H&C had more than adequate time to conduct discovery. 
The summary judgment was not granted prematurely. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE 
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND STATE FARM IS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Summary judgment is properly granted where there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. , P. 2d , 158 U.A.R. 31 (Utah App. 1991); Rule 
56, U.R.C.P. For the following reasons, the trial court was 
correct in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
A. Hill Has No Cause of Action Because He Was Not In Privity 
of Contract With State Farm, and State Farm Therefore Owed 
Hill No Duty. 
The $5,510 payment for which State Farm made a subrogation 
claim was paid by State Farm to Caldwell for damage to his 
Honda. This was the payment of a first-party insurance claim. 
State Farmfs policy with Caldwell gave State Farm the right to 
"be subrogated to all [Caldwell's] rights of recovery" with 
respect to the collision payment. (R. 239) Hill had no 
ownership interest in the car and no claim for property damage 
against Bryan. Thus, State Farm was subrogated only to 
Caldwell's rights. CUMIS and Caldwell both recognized this in 
the release Caldwell signed which stated that a separate 
settlement draft was being made payable to State Farm and 
Caldwell for $5,510 representing property damage. (R. 113) 
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Subrogation is "the substitution of another person in the 
place of a creditor, so that the person in whose favor it is 
exercised succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to 
the debt." 8 3 C.J.S. Subrogation §1. State Farm substituted 
itself only in the place of Caldwell with respect to the 
property damage payment because Caldwell was the "creditor" who 
had a claim for property damage against Bryan. This was 
evidenced by the original judgment entered by Judge Billings for 
$5,510 plus interest in favor of State Farm and solely against 
Caldwell, not Hill. (R. 135-37) 
Hill was not an insured with respect to the collision 
coverage of Caldwell's policy, nor the corresponding right of 
subrogation arising therefrom. 
H&C do not assert any bad faith with respect to State Farm's 
investigation and payment of the collision claim. Instead, they 
claim State Farm acted in bad faith after the collision claim 
was paid by refusing to waive its subrogation right as part of 
H&C's settlement with CUMIS. This is nonetheless a first-party 
insurance bad faith claim because it arises out of the payment 
of Caldwell's collision claim. 
An analogous situation arose in AMICA Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), in which Schettler claimed 
AMICA's conduct after it paid Schettler's first-party claim 
constituted bad faith. Schettler followed Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), which held there is a 
contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
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applicable to first-party insurance claims. Beck refused to 
recognize a tort cause of action for bad faith in first-party 
insurance claims. 
Schettler held that "[i]n order to maintain an action under 
a contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the parties must be 
in privity of contract at the time of the alleged wrong. . . ." 
768 P.2d at 957-58. 
Hill must establish privity of contract with respect to the 
collision coverage out of which State Farm's subrogation rights 
arose in order to assert a first-party bad faith claim. Hill 
cannot do this. There was no privity of contract between Hill 
and State Farm with respect to the collision coverage. 
That privity of contract is absolutely necessary to assert 
a viable insurance bad faith claim was reiterated by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in the recent case of Pixton v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., supra, filed on April 8, 1991. 
Pixton was a State Farm insured who was injured in an 
automobile accident with another State Farm insured, Davies. 
State Farm paid first-party no-fault benefits for Pixton. 
Pixton sued Davies for personal injury. She also sued State 
Farm, claiming, inter alia, State Farm breached its contract and 
its duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to disclose 
the amount State Farm paid to International Rehabilitation 
Associates for its assistance in evaluating Pixton's medical 
condition, and by using the same adjuster to handle both the 
first and third-party claims. 
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Pixton settled her personal injury claim against Davies but 
continued her suit against State Farm. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of State Farm, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. It held State Farm owed no duty of good faith 
to Pixton even though she was a first-party no-fault insured. 
The court noted Pixton did not claim State Farm failed to 
properly pay her first-party no-fault claim. 
Relying on Beck, supra, Schettler, supra, and Ammerman v. 
Farmer's Ins. Exch. , 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), the 
Court of Appeals stated: 
Beck and AMICA specifically define the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing as a 
contractual duty running from the insurer to 
its insured. In Ammerman, the supreme court 
indicated that the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, even in third-party situations where 
the insurer has a fiduciary duty to fairly 
defend its insured, arose "because of the 
policy," and was "regarded as a separate cause 
of action for a wrong done to the insured by 
violating a fiduciary duty owed to him." . . . 
In the case before us, Pixton has no 
relevant contractual relationship with State 
Farm. Pixton makes no claim that State Farm 
failed to perform any obligation under her no-
fault insurance policy with State Farm. . . . 
[A]ll her first-party claims were settled to 
her satisfaction. Thus, under Beck, State Farm 
owes Pixton no duty as there is no relevant 
contractual relationship. Neither is there a 
duty under Ammerman as there is no fiduciary 
relationship based on a covenant to defend. 
[Emphasis added] 
Pixton clearly shows State Farm owed Hill no duty of good 
faith concerning the collision coverage issue because "there is 
no relevant contractual relationship." Hill was not an insured 
12 
for collision coverage purposes. Where there is no privity of 
contract, there is no duty. Therefore, Hill has no claim for 
bad faith against State Farm. 
Hill's claim that he was in privity of contract with State 
Farm because State Farm paid no-fault benefits is without merit. 
Hill has not claimed State Farm acted in bad faith in 
investigating and paying him over $6,000 in no-fault benefits. 
Although Hill claims State Farm pursued a claim for no-fault 
reimbursement, the facts do not support that (R. 34 3) 
Even though paragraph 5 of the policy conditions clearly 
gave State Farm the contractual right to seek such reimbursement 
it waived said right. (R. 239-40) Assuming, therefore, 
arguendo, State Farm did at some point assert a right of no-
fault reimbursement, its contract allowed it to do so, and Hill 
v. State Farm, supra, recognized the equitable doctrine of 
subrogation "can be modified by contract." 765 P.2d at 866. 
Further, Utah's No-Fault Act specifically sanctions a no-fault 
insurer's right of reimbursement from the tortfeasor's insurer. 
Utah Code Ann. $31A-22-309(6), formerly U.C.A. $31-41-11. 
Nonetheless, despite both the contractual right of subrogation 
and the above-specified statutory provision, State Farm waived 
its claim for no-fault reimbursement within approximately two 
months after the accident. Certainly there could be no bad 
faith arising out of such conduct, even assuming State Farm 
asserted its contractual and statutory right of reimbursement. 
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B. There Is No Material Issue of Fact Concerning Entitlement to 
the $5,510 or Concerning Whether the Releases Breached the 
Insurance Contract. 
H&C claim there are material issues of fact regarding State 
Farm's right to subrogation and reimbursement from CUMIS and 
concerning whether the releases H&C signed breached the 
insurance policy contract. H&C are mistaken. The Supreme Court 
remanded the case for a determination of two fact issues, 
namely, whether H&C were fully compensated and whether State 
Farm's subrogation rights had been prejudiced. The resolution 
of these facts would result in a determination of who was 
entitled to the disputed $5,510. 
Since State Farm paid Caldwell the disputed money after 
remand, those fact issues are no longer material to the case. 
The trial court specifically recognized this in the March 26, 
1990, Judgment, which stated the only remaining issues were bad 
faith and punitive damages. (R. 346-49) 
C. There Was No Bad Faith, as a Matter of Law, Because the 
Subrogation Issue Was Fairly Debatable. 
H&C also claim there are ma arial issues of fact concerning 
whether State Farm acted in bad faith by asserting its 
subrogation right against CUMIS and whether State Farm has the 
burden of proving its subrogation demand was accurate. 
State Farm submits there are no disputed material facts on 
these issues. State Farm notified CUMIS of its property damage 
subrogation claim. State Farm refused to waive that claim. 
State Farm agreed to waive its claim for reimbursement of no-
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fault benefits. It confirmed this by letter to CUMIS in August, 
1982. (R. 343) 
In addition to State Farm's August, 1982 letter to CUMIS 
waiving its right of no-fault reimbursement, the releases signed 
by H&C clearly state that no money was withheld for no-fault 
reimbursement. The only disputed amount was the $5,510 paid for 
property damage. 
H&Cfs bad faith claims are for first-party insurance bad 
faith, which are contract, not tort claims. See Beck, 
Schettler, and Pixton, supra. Regardless of H&Cfs 
characterization of their bad faith complaint (see Appellants1 
Brief at 29), it is ultimately grounded upon H&C's allegation 
that State Farm acted in bad faith by refusing to waive its 
subrogation right. If that issue, i.e., waiver of the 
subrogation claim, was fairly debatable, then there is no bad 
faith, as a matter of law. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 
745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). In Callioux, the court stated: 
If the evidence presented creates a 
factual issue as to the claim's validity, there 
exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby 
legitimizing the denial of the claim, and 
eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a claim 
is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to 
debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter 
of fact or law." . . . 
This general policy was explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. 
Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980): 
It would not comport with our 
ideas of either law or justice to 
prevent any party who entertained 
bona fide questions about his 
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legal obligations from seeking 
adjudication thereon in the 
courts• 
745 P.2d at 842• An insurance company cannot be found to 
have acted in bad faith for debating either a factual or a legal 
issue that is fairly debatable. 
in Callioux, Progressive denied Callioux1 first-party fire 
loss claim. Callioux was charged criminally with arson and 
subsequently acquitted. Thereafter, Progressive paid the fire 
claim, and Callioux sued for bad faith. The trial court granted 
summary judgment for Progressive, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding the claim was fairly debatable and there was 
no bad faith, as a matter of law. 
The same principle applies in the instant case. The issue 
of whether State Farm was required to waive its subrogation 
claim is and has been throughout the pendency of this case, 
fairly debatable. (R. 368-69) The history of the case 
establishes this. 
For example, Judge Billings agreed with State Farm's 
position and not only dismissed H&Cfs complaint in its entirety, 
but also granted summary judgment against Caldwell. Although 
the Supreme Co rt reversed that decision, it was on the basis 
that there were factual issues regarding entitlement to the 
$5,510. The Supreme Court did not hold State Farm was not 
entitled to the disputed moneys. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court's opinion did not give the slightest support to H&Cfs bad 
faith claim. It would have been obviously contradictory for the 
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Supreme Court to indicate State Farm might still be entitled to 
the money and at the same time suggest State Farm acted in bad 
faith by asserting its right to the money. 
The question of entitlement to the money is a fairly 
debatable issue, both factually and legally. In its original 
motion for summary judgment, State Farm relied upon Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), for the 
proposition that since Caldwell and Hill both identified the 
$5,510 in their releases as payment made for property damages, 
Caldwell was not entitled to double payment. (R. 78-84) Judge 
Billings agreed with this legal position. The Supreme Court 
held there were factual issues. In either case, the issue is 
fairly debatable. 
H&C apparently recognize no issue regarding the value of 
their wrongful death claims, arguing there is "uncontroverted, 
unimpeached and unassailable" evidence that the death claims 
were worth more than $50,000. If the Supreme Court had so 
found, it would not have identified value of the claims as a 
factual issue on remand. 
Further, H&C fail to recognize that CUMIS1 single limit 
liability policy created a significant problem in this case. 
The single limit was intended to cover both personal injury and 
property damage liabilities. Liability coverage for both 
personal injury and property damage is mandatory under Utah's 
insurance code. U.C.A. $$31A-22-302, 303, 304 and 41-12A-301. 
See also, former U.C.A. 4^41-12-1, 21 and 31-41-4, 5; Allstate 
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Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980); 
Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
H&C's position regarding entitlement to settlement moneys 
would result in the CUMIS policy providing no property damage 
liability coverage in violation of the Utah Insurance Code. 
Based on the foregoing, State Farm submits the subrogation 
issue is and always has been fairly debatable, and, therefore, 
there can be no first-party bad faith, as a matter of law. 
POINT II, 
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR 
HILL'S BAD FAITH CLAIM. 
H&C assert the doctrine of equitable subrogation somehow 
establishes a right in Hill to assert a bad faith claim. 
Equitable subrogation has nothing to do with bad faith. It does 
not arise out of contract. Alleging a right of equitable 
subrogation establishes even more clearly the absence of privity 
of contract between State Farm and Hill. 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified two types of bad faith 
with respect to insurance companies, namely, third-party bad 
faith which arises where the insurer is defending its insured 
against a liability claim; and, first-party bad faith which 
arises in the context of the payment by an insurer of a first-
party claim. See Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., supra. The 
instant case does not involve third-party bad faith. The only 
theory available to Hill is first-party bad faith. Such a claim 
requires privity of contract, Point I.A., supra. As a 
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consequence, the concept of equitable subrogation has absolutely 
nothing to do with, and cannot be the basis for, a claim by Hill 
for first-party bad faith. 
POINT III, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY NOT BE AWARDED IN FIRST-
PARTY BAD FAITH CLAIMS. 
H&C assert punitive damages may be awarded in a first-party 
bad faith case. They failed to cite Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), where the Supreme Court 
addressed that very issue. Canyon Country Store involved a 
first-party insurance claim for property damages. The insurance 
companies refused to pay the claims. Canyon Country filed suit 
for various types of damages, including punitive damages. 
Canyon Country obtained a jury verdict for the property damages 
claimed, for certain lost profits, and for attorney's fees, but 
the jury did not award any punitive damages. It is not clear 
whether the trial court even submitted the punitive damages 
issue to the jury. 
On appeal, Canyon Country claimed the trial court erred by 
refusing to allow Canyon Country to submit evidence regarding 
the insurers1 wealth. The Supreme Court rejected that argument 
and stated: 
It is alleged that this information was crucial 
in order to prove punitive damages. The amount 
of a punitive damages award is not at issue in 
this appeal, however. Under Beck, punitive 
damages are not available. Allegations of a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing owed first-party insurers and 
their insured sound in contract, not in tort. 
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781 P.2d at 423. Canyon Country Store makes it absolutely 
clear that no punitive damages may be awarded in the instant 
case on the basis of an alleged first-party bad faith claim. 
In addition, there is no basis for a punitive damage award 
because H&C alleged no independent tort against State Farm. H&C 
argue that their original complaint asserted facts sufficient to 
establish the tort of interference with economic relations. 
This simply is not correct. The original complaint alleged that 
H&C's wrongful death claims had a value which exceeded CUMIS1 
policy limit, that State Farm was therefore not entitled to any 
of the proceeds from the policy, and that State Farm acted in 
bad faith by refusing to waive its subrogation claim. The 
prayer of the complaint asked for an award of "punitive damages 
for bad faith in obstructing settlement of plaintiffs1 claim 
against a tort feasor and causing unnecessary litigation. . . . " 
Thus, H&C's claim for punitive damages was based upon their 
theory that State Farm acted in bad faith, which, as already set 
forth, is a first-party contractual bad faith claim for which no 
punitive damages may be awarded. 
The trial courtfs summary judgment dismissing all punitive 
damage claims should be affirmed. 
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POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING H&C'S MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED 
COMPLAINT. 
The motion for leave to amend was filed more than seven 
years after the automobile accident and more than five and a 
half years after the original complaint was filed. (R. 2-3, 
278) The proposed amended complaint contained allegations never 
previously asserted, including intentional interference with 
contract and economic relations. In addition, totally new 
damage claims were made, including claims for "physical, mental, 
and emotional distress, anguish, pain and suffering; . . . 
substantial disability and lost earning capacity . . ., impaired 
. . . ability to mitigate and avert . . . loss of [Hill's] 
family home . . .." (See R. 280-87) 
This case had already gone to the Supreme Court on the 
initial complaint, which contained none of the above 
allegations. The Supreme Court remanded the case for 
determination of who was entitled to the $5,510. 
Amendments after remand should not be allowed where they are 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision. See 6 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure ^ 1489. The allegations in 
the proposed amended complaint were not consistent with the 
Supreme Court's decision which was that State Farm could not 
have summary judgment and receive the $5,510 because there were 
disputed material issues of fact. 
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H&C filed their motion to amend after State Farm filed its 
motion for summary judgment in May of 1989. Since State Farm's 
motion sought dismissal of all punitive damage claims because no 
independent tort had been alleged, and because first-party bad 
faith was not the basis for a punitive damage claim in Utah, H&C 
obviously decided they needed to assert an independent tort. 
This is not a justifiable reason to allow an amendment. 
Allowing an amendment to pleadings "is discretionary with 
the trial court" and will not be disturbed on appeal "absent an 
abuse of discretion." Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 
784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah App. 1989); see also, Rule 15, 
U.R.C.P. 
In Reichert, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to amend his counterclaim three 
years after his original answer was filed, and on the day before 
trial was scheduled to begin. The court stated: 
Appellate courts have upheld a trial 
court's denial of a motion to amend where the 
amendment is sought late in the course of the 
litigation, where there is no adequate 
explanation or the delay, and where the movant 
was aware of the facts underlying the proposed 
amendment long before its filing. 
784 P.2d at 1216. In the instant case, H&C attempted to inject 
new claims and issues through their amended complaint. There is 
no valid justification for this. H&C simply tried to create a 
punitive damage case where none existed. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to amend. 
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In addition, the proposed amended complaint fails to state 
a cognizable independent tort cause of action. Interference 
with contract requires evidence of "conduct which 'intentionally 
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract 
. . ..
f
" Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
301 (Utah 1982). The tort of intentional interference with 
economic relations requires proof of intentional interference 
"for an improper purpose or by improper means." Id. at 304. 
Even assuming H&C had a contract and/or economic relations 
which could have been interfered with, H&C cannot establish any 
improper interference, purpose, or means. State Farm asserted 
its subrogation claim, a fairly debatable issue, which State 
Farm was clearly entitled to have determined by the court. See 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., supra. Two district judges 
and the Supreme Court have already considered the matter. None 
of them have found that State Farm did not have a valid 
subrogation claim. Therefore, since the issue was fairly 
debatable, it could not, as a matter of law, be the basis for 
the tort of interference with contract or economic relations. 
POINT V. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT GRANTED PRE- MATURELY. 
H&C argue State Farm acted unreasonably and made grief 
stricken parents wait years and years for their $5,510. 
(Appellants1 Brief at 17, 22-23) At the same time, H&C argue 
summary judgment was granted prematurely, and that they need "a 
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reasonable time in which to conduct discovery." (^ d. at 31) 
Such positions are inconsistent. 
H&C had adequate time to conduct discovery. The Supreme 
Court issued its Remittitur to the trial court on December 1, 
1988. (R. 205) Copy attached as Addendum 8. State Farm filed 
its motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment on 
May 5, 1989. (R. 248-49) H&C conducted no discovery between 
those two dates. In fact, between the date of Remittitur (12-1-
88) and the date of the trial court's final judgment (6-11-90), 
H&C served one set of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents, to which State Farm responded on August 
1, 1989. (R. 301-304) H&C have had sufficient time to conduct 
discovery. 
H&C also argue State Farm presented no new facts after 
Remittitur to support its summary judgment motions. This is 
inaccurate. After Remittitur, State Farm paid Caldwell the 
disputed money. This narrowed the remaining issues to those of 
bad faith and punitive damages which could be decided as a 
matter of law. Furthermore A case law developed after H&C filed 
their first appeal helped to resolve those remaining issues, as 
a matter of law. See Beck v. Farmer's Ins. Exch. , supra; AMICA 
Ins.«J£o. v. Schettler, supra; Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. , supra; Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., supra; Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, supra. 
The summary judgment was properly granted and was not 
premature. 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was proper in this case and should be 
affirmed for the following reasons: 
1. Hill and State Farm were not in privity of contract, 
State Farm owed Hill no duty, and therefore Hill has no claim 
for bad faith or punitive damages. 
2. Hill's and Caldwell's bad faith claims are claims for 
first-party insurance bad faith, which are contract, not tort 
claims, and no punitive damages may be awarded for such bad 
faith claims. 
3. There is no basis for a punitive damage claim because 
there is no claim of independent tortious conduct by State Farm. 
4. There is no bad faith, as a matter of law, because the 
subrogation issue is, and always has been, fairly debatable. 
5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Hill's and Caldwell's motion to amend. 
6. Summary judgment was not premature because Hill and 
Caldwell had a reasonable time to conduct discovery. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Rule 56, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 15, U.R.C.P. 
2. October 22, 1984, Judgment 
3. Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1988) 
4. February 7, 1990, Order denying motion to amend 
5. March 26, 1990, Judgment 
6. June 11, 1990, Judgment 
7. August 9, 1982, letter from State Farm to CUMIS 
8. Remittitur 
ADDENDUM 1 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and tha t the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on mot ion . If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time t h d any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faun or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings, 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, individu-
ally and as personal 
representative of the heirs 
Of TAMARA ELAINE HILL, 
deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, individually and 
as personal representative 
of the heirs of TROY 
NEIL CALDWELL, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
KENNETH PAUL BRYAN, 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Honorable Judith M. Billinqs 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
On September 28, 1984, this matter came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Judith M. Billings, one of the judges of 
the above-entitled court, on motion for summary judgment of 
defendant State Farm, and on motion for summary judgment of 
third-party defendant Kenneth Paul Bryan. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their attorney, Wallace R. Lauchnor. Defendant 
State Farm was represented by its attorney, Glenn C. Hanni of 
the firm of Strong & Hanni. Third-party defendant was represented 
by his attorney, Heinz J. Mahler of the firm of Kipp and Christian. 
It was stipulated by plaintiffs and defendant State Farm 
that a copy of the depositions that have been taken in this case 
could be used with the same force and effect as the original. 
The court having heard arguments of counsel and being 
fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted and judgment is hereby entered on plaintiffs1 complaint 
in favor of defendant State Farm and against plaintiffs and all 
of them, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on its counterclaim against plaintiffs is hereby granted and 
judgment is hereby entered in favor of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean 
Caldwell, for the sum of $5510.00 with interest on said sum at 
the rate of 10% per annum from March 16, 1983, being the date 
that Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. delivered its check to plaintiff, 
-2-
Lorin Dean Caldwell, which said check was payable to defendant 
State Farm and Lorin Dean Caldwell, to the date hereof, making 
a total judgment in favor of State Farm and against plaintiff, 
Lorin Dean Caldwell of Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Three 
and 11/100 Dollars ($6,393.11) together with costs in the amount 
of $ . This judgment shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid. 
3. Plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, shall forthwith 
endorse said Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. check and shall 
deliver the same to counsel for defendant State Farm. 
4. The motion of third-party defendant, Kenneth Paul 
Bryan, for summary judgment is hereby granted and judgment is 
hereby entered in favor of Kenneth Paul Bryan and against State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on the third-party 
complaint, no cause of action. 
Dated this $$'/uf day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM 3 
864 Utah 765 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Robert Kent HILL, individually and as 
Personal Representative of the heirs of 
Tamara Elaine Hill, deceased, and Lo-
rin Dean Caldwell, individually and as 
personal representative of the heirs of 
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, 
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Kenneth Paul BRYAN, Third-Party 
Defendant and Cross-Appellee. 
Nos. 20335, 20391. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 1, 1988. 
Subsequent to settlement of wrongful 
death action, personal representatives of 
persons killed in accident filed suit against 
automobile insurer. Insurer filed third-par-
ty claim against driver of second automo-
bile. The District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Judith M. Billings, J., granted summary 
judgment for automobile insurer on issue 
of subrogation and denied insurer's sum-
mary judgment motion against driver of 
second automobile. Personal representa-
tives and insurer appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) in deter-
mining allocation of amount received by 
insured from third-party tort-feasor for 
subrogation purposes, it is not assumed 
that the amount of the settlement is coex-
tensive with the amount of damages in-
curred; (2) in absence of specific contractu-
al terms in either the release and settle-
ment or the insurance policy, the insured 
must be made whole prior to any recovery 
by insurer against the tort-feasor; and (3) 
where personal representatives released 
driver of second automobile from further 
liability in order to obtain settlement, insur-
er's only recourse was to show either that 
the personal representatives were fully 
compensated or that personal representa-
tives' action in releasing second driver 
breached .the insurance policy. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. 
See also 709 P.2d 257. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=»934(1) 
In reviewing grant of motion for sum-
mary judgment, all doubts or uncertainties 
concerning issues of fact are viewed in 
light most favorable to party opposing 
summary judgment. 
2. Subrogation <3=>1 
Subrogation is equitable doctrine and 
is governed by equitable principles. 
3. .Insurance <S=>601 
In absence of express terms to the 
contrary, insured must be made whole be-
fore the insurer is entitled to be reim-
bursed from a recovery from the third-par-
tv tort-feasor. 
4. Insurance e=»606(l) 
Where court record did not reveal ex-
tent of subrogation terms of automobile 
policy and it was not possible to ascertain 
intent of parties as to extent of their re-
spective rights under the subrogation 
clause, the doctrine of subrogation would 
be applied according to general principles 
of equity. 
5. Insurance <3=>606(10) 
Where personal representatives of mo-
torists killed in accident released driver of 
second automobile from further liability in 
order to obtain settlement with insurer of 
second automobile, they were not entitled 
to' receive future compensation from driver 
of second automobile; thus, insurer of first 
automobile could only be reimbursed from 
personal representatives of persons killed 
in the accident and had no claim on driver 
of second automobile. 
6. Insurance @»601 
In determining allocation of amount 
received by insured from third-party tort-
feasor in order to determine insurer's right 
to subrogation, it is not assumed that the 
amount of the settlement is coextensive 
with the amount of damages incurred. 
HILL v. STATE FARM 
Cite as 765 P~2d 
7. Judgment <3=>181(23) 
Where amount of damages suffered by 
insured was disputed by insured and insur-
er, summary judgment on automobile in-
surer's subrogation ckum was not appropri-
ate. 
8, Insurance <3=>601 
If plaintiffs' action in releasing tort-
feasor breaches insurance policy and insur-
er can show it could have recovered from 
tort-feasor, it will be entitled to proceeds as 
a matter of equity. 
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Salt Lake City, for 
Robert Kent Hill and Lorin Dean Caldwell. 
Glenn C. Hanni, R. Scott Williams, Salt 
Lake City, for State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. 
J. Anthony Eyre, Heinz J. Mahler, Salt 
Lake City, for Kenneth Paul Bryan. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant, 
arguing that numerous triable issues of 
fact exist and claiming bad faith. State 
Farm appeals from a judgment in favor of 
third-party defendant Bryan. We reverse 
the judgment against plaintiffs and affirm 
the judgment against State Farm. 
On June 6, 1982, an automobile owned 
and driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan, who 
was legally intoxicated, ran a red light and 
struck a vehicle owned by plaintiff Lorin 
Caldwell and driven by Caldwell's son. 
Plaintiff Robert Hill's daughter was an oc-
cupant in Caldwell's vehicle. The force of 
the impact was fatal to both Caldwell's son 
and Hill's daughter. At the time of the 
accident, Caldwell's vehicle was insured by 
State Farm; Bryan's vehicle was insured 
by Cumis Insurance International. State 
Farm paid $5,510 to Caldwell for property 
damage to his vehicle. Shortly thereafter, 
Cumis offered to tender the policy limits of 
$50,000 on Bryan's policy to plaintiffs in an 
attempt to satisfy plaintiffs' claims. State 
1. To arrive at these figures, the parties subtract-
ed the property damage amount from the total 
policy proceeds and divided the remainder 
equally between them. The disputed property 
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Farm thereupon notified Cumis of its sub-
rogation claim for the amount it had paid 
Caldwell for property damage. 
Both plaintiffs contacted attorneys, who 
filed separate suits against Bryan and inde-
pendently investigated the extent of his 
financial holdings. These investigations re-
vealed that, aside from the Cumis policy, 
Bryan was insolvent. After this discovery, 
Caldwell and Hill withdrew their suits 
against Bryan and made a claim with Cu-
mis for the policy proceeds, which were to 
be divided evenly between them. Cumis 
refused to simply deliver one-half to each 
plaintiff because of State Farm's subroga-
tion claim. Plaintiffs therefore sought a 
waiver of claim from State Farm, arguing 
that the value of their wrongful death ac-
tions far exceeded Bryan's policy limits. 
State Farm refused to waive its subroga-
tion claim and apparently urged plaintiffs 
to litigate their suits against Bryan so that 
the amount of their damages could be judi-
cially ascertained. Plaintiffs determined 
the cost of acquiring such a judicial deter-
mination to be prohibitive. 
Plaintiffs signed separate releases of 
claims in favor of Bryan, Cumis, and other 
possible defendants. In return, Cumis ten-
dered $22,245 to Hill and $27,755 to Cald-
well.1 
Because Cumis refused to proffer policy 
proceeds unless State Farm's subrogation 
interest was accounted for, its tender to 
Caldwell consisted of a check for $22,245 
made to Caldwell alone and a check for 
$5,510 made jointly to Caldwell and State 
Farm. The latter draft corresponded to 
the amount of property damage incurred 
by Caldwell and accounted for State 
Farm's subrogation claim. The release 
signed by Caldwell recognized the dispute 
surrounding the $5,510 by stating: 
[A] controversy exists between State 
Farm Mutual Insurance Company and 
Lorin D. Caldwell as to who is entitled to 
the said amount, and that the matter will 
be resolved between the two or by pay-
damage award was then added to Caldwell's 
portion because he was the owner of the dam-
aged automobile. 
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ment into court or by judicial determina-
tion. 
Plaintiffs and State Farm failed to reach 
an accord for more than one year after the 
release was signed. Plaintiffs filed suit 
against State Farm, seeking payment of 
$5,510 and alleging bad faith on behalf of 
State Farm for its refusal to waive the 
subrogation claim. In turn, State Farm 
filed a third-party claim against Bryan for 
subrogation and indemnity. State Farm 
also counterclaimed against plaintiffs for 
$5,510. 
State Farm filed a motion for summary 
judgment on both plaintiffs' complaints and 
on its own counterclaim. The trial court 
granted the motion, awarding State Farm 
$5,510, interest, and attorney fees. The 
court also decreed that State Farm had no 
cause of action against Bryan. 
[1] In reviewing a grant of a motion for 
summary judgment, all doubts or uncer-
tainties concerning issues of fact are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 
1984). Where a triable issue of fact exists, 
the cause will be remanded for determina-
tion of that issue. 
Defendant State Farm asserts that it is 
subrogated to the rights of plaintiffs and 
that State Farm should thereby recover the 
amount it paitf for property damage from 
the amount plaintiffs recovered from the 
third-party tort-feasor. Plaintiffs argue 
that State Farm's subrogation rights do 
not arise until plaintiffs have been made 
whole. 
[2,3] Subrogation is an equitable doc-
trine and is governed by equitable princi-
ples. This doctrine can be modified by 
contract, but in the absence of express 
terms to the contrary, the insured must be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to 
be reimbursed from a recovery from the 
third-party tort-feasor. Lyon v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 
318, 480 P.2d 739, 744 (1971). Noncontrac-
tual subrogation rights will only be en-
forced on behalf of a party maintaining a 
superior equitable position, and the insur-
er's equitable position cannot be superior to 
the insured's unless the insured has been 
completely compensated. Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 
P.2d 783 (1972); see also Culver v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 221 N.J. Super. 493, 
535 A.2d 15 (1987); Westendorfv. Stassori, 
330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.1983). 
When the amount of damages incurred 
by the insured has been judicially ascer-
tained, the extent of the subrogation right 
of the insurer is usually undisputed. The 
insured is not entitled to double recovery, 
arid the insurer is equitably entitled to re-
cover any amounts from the insured that 
the insured recovered from the tort-feasor. 
When the insured settles with the tort-
feasor before the amount of damages has 
been judicially determined, it is more diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the insurer is 
entitled to recover all or any of the amount 
paid on the policy to the insured. See 
generally Comment, Subrogation in 
Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of 
Insurers and Insureds in Settlements 
with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp. 
L.Q. 667 (1983). 
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. 
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 
(1972), this Court examined an insurance 
company's claim for subrogation against its 
insured where the insured had settled with 
a third-party tort-feasor. The insurance 
company asserted that the settlement cov-
ered the insured's entire claim and that the 
insurance company was therefore entitled 
to receive reimbursement for the medical 
expenses it had paid the insured. In revis-
ing the summary judgment, this Court not-
ed that a lump-sum settlement without ap-
portionment as to specific items of damage 
is not sufficient to indicate whether the 
insured had received double compensation 
for the same injury. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 106, 
505 P.2d at 786. In order to ascertain what 
the .settlement in Barnes was intended to 
cover, this Court reversed and remanded 
the cause for a trial. Id. 29 Utah 2d at 107, 
505 ?.2d at 787. 
Setting forth the purpose and intended 
allocation of money given in the settlement 
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is a simple matter. As this Court noted in 
Barnes, to the extent a negotiated settle-
ment was intended to include damages pre-
viously paid to the insured by the insurer, 
the tort-feasor who is aware of the insur-
er's subrogation claim should offer pay-
ment in two drafts: one draft for the in-
sured alone and a separate draft issued to 
the insured and the insurer jointly. Id. 29 
Utah 2d at 106, 505 P.2d at 787. In so 
doing, the apportionment of the settlement 
amount is clearly shown and the intentions 
of the parties can most effectively be en-
forced. 
[4] In the case now before the Court, 
the insurer's right to subrogation was set 
forth in the insurance policy. Unfortunate-
ly, the record does not reveal the extent of 
the subrogation terms, nor does it provide 
a complete copy of the insurance policy. 
We are thus unable to ascertain the intent 
of the parties as to the extent of their 
respective rights under the subrogation 
clause. Therefore, the doctrine of subroga-
tion should be applied in this case accord-
ing to general principles of equity. 
As suggested in Barnes, Cumis prepared 
two separate drafts when tendering pay-
ment to Caldwell under the settlement. 
The first draft was to Caldwell alone and 
the second draft, in the amount of $5,510, 
was made to Caldwell and State Farm. 
State Farm now argues that the joint draft 
was intended by plaintiffs and Bryan to 
cover plaintiffs' property damage. This 
contention is incorrect. The language of 
the release does not provide for the alloca-
tion of the $5,510. The release states that 
the parties have yet to determine the right-
ful owner of that amount because "a con-
troversy exists" between State Farm and 
Caldwell "as to who was entitled to the 
said amount, and that the matter will be 
resolved between the two or by payment 
into court or by judicial determination." In 
other words, at the time the draft was 
conveyed to State Farm and Caldwell, the 
parties had not agreed whether that 
amount was intended for property damage 
or to satisfy the wrongful death claim. 
Cumis acted properly in acknowledging 
State Farm's subrogation claim and in be-
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ing certain that, to the extent State Farm 
was justified in taking reimbursement from 
Cumis's policy limits, it would be able to do 
so. Nonetheless, the plain language of the 
release shows that neither Cumis nor plain-
tiffs intended the amount to be allocated to 
property damage without further negotia-
tion. 
[5] Because the parties have been un-
able to resolve the subrogation question, 
we are required to determine who is enti-
tled to the settlement proceeds. State 
Farm argues that the amount recovered by 
plaintiffs from Cumis represents the entire 
amount of plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs, 
on the other hand, argue that the amount 
received from Cumis only compensates 
them for a portion of their damages and 
therefore they are not obligated to reim-
burse State Farm until they receive a full 
recovery. Since plaintiffs released Bryan 
from further liability in order to obtain the 
settlement with Cumis, they are not enti-
tled to receive future compensation from 
Bryan. Thus, State Farm can only be reim-
bursed from plaintiffs and has no claim on 
Biiyan. See 73 Am. Jur.2d Subrogation 
§ 106 (subrogee's rights are subject to limi-
tations placed on the rights of subrogor). 
[6] In determining the allocation of an 
amount received by an insured from a 
third-party tort-feasor, we do not assume 
that the amount of the settlement is coex-
tensive with the amount of damages in-
curred. Damages encompass the injuries 
suffered by a plaintiff. The amount of a 
settlement almost universally reflects the 
greatest amount that a plaintiff could have 
possibly received from a tort-feasor with-
out litigation. As the court in Janzen v. 
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 
1979), stated: 
fMJany considerations enter into settle-
ments. Respondent may have wished to 
avoid possibly protracted and frustrating 
legal battles; respondent may have need-
ed the money immediately; or respon-
dent may have been pressured into the 
'agreement for other reasons. Thus, the 
amount of the settlement and compensa-
tion may not adequately reflect the actu-
al loss 
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Id. at 70; see also Cooper v. Younkin, 339 
N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn.1983); Florida 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377 
So.2d 827, 830-31 (Fla.1979). 
One of the considerations which may lead 
an insured to settle with a third-party tort-
feasor for an amount less than its damages 
is that the tort-feasor is insolvent and less 
than adequately insured. Here, Bryan was 
personally insolvent, and his insurance poli-
cy was for an amount apparently insuffi-
cient to cover the full extent of plaintiffs' 
claims.2 
Several courts have noted the importance 
of a tort-feasor's solvency or adequacy of 
insurance in influencing the insured's deci-
sion to settle and will not allow an insurer 
to exercise a subrogation claim where the 
settlement was reached due to the tort-fea-
sor's inability to fully compensate the in-
sured. See, e.g., Government Employees 
Ins. Co. v. Graff, 327 So.2d 88, 91 (Fla. 
1976); Cooper, 339 N.W.2d at 554. 
In light of these principles and prevailing 
Utah law, we hold that in the absence of 
specific contractual terms in either the re-
lease and settlement or the insurance poli-
cy, the insured must be made whole prior 
to any recovery by the insurer against the 
tort-feasor. Where the insured settles with 
the tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes 
to the insured unless the insurer can prove 
that the insured has already received full 
compensation. 
Our holding does not undermine the sug-
gestion in Barnes that a settlement agree-
ment can effectively allocate the damages 
it is intended to cover through the use of 
multiple drafts made out to appropriate 
parties. Instead, where the language of 
the release leaves the allocation uncertain 
and where there is no controlling contractu-
al language to the contrary, the insured 
should be given the benefit of the doubt as 
to its damages and the burden will rest 
with the insurer to prove that the insured 
has been fully compensated. This proce-
dure has been used by other courts and will 
result in the most effective implementation 
of the equitable principles underlying the 
2. This is evidenced by Cumis's willingness to 
tender the full policy amount prior to litigation 
doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Conlon, 153 
Conn. 415, 216 A.2d 828 (1966); Dimick ex 
rel. Dimick v. Lewis, 127 N.H. 141, 497 
A.2d 1221 (1985). 
[7] In the instant case, the amount of 
plaintiffs' damages is a question of fact 
which has yet to be determined. There is 
no specific contractual language in the in-
surance policy which requires allocation of 
the settlement amount, nor does the re-
lease specify who should receive the $5,510 
paid jointly to State Farm and Caldwell. 
Because the amount of plaintiffs' damages 
is disputed by the parties, that amount 
should be set through judicial determina-
tion so that the proceeds from Bryan's 
policy can be equitably distributed. That 
judicial determination will be factually 
based, and therefore summary judgment 
was inappropriate in this case. 
State Farm also claims that if it is not 
entitled to the $5,510 payment from 
Bryan's insurer, then the releases signed 
by Hill and Caldwell cannot act to extin-
guish its subrogation claim against Bryan. 
Allowing plaintiffs to extinguish State 
Farm's claims would be tantamount to a 
breach of the subrogation provision in the 
insurance policy. If, however, the amount 
of damages incurred by plaintiffs exceeds 
the amount paid by Bryan, then State Farm 
must also demonstrate that it could have 
recovered the $5,510 from Bryan, absent 
the releases and without relying on the 
insurance policy proceeds. See, e.g., Royal 
Indem. Co. v. Pharr, 94 Ga. App. 114, 117, 
93 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1956). As we stated in 
Barnes: 
The plaintiff [insurer] to establish a su-
perior equity and thus to be entitled to 
prevail must present proof which estab-
lishes that the damages covered by de-
fendant's settlement were the same or 
cover those for which the defendant has 
already received indemnity from plain-
tiff; otherwise, the receipt of payment 
from the tort-feasor does not entitle the 
plaintiff to the return of the payments 
made by it. 
or serious negotiation over the amount of plain-
tiffs' damages. 
Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106-07, 505 P.2d 
783, 787 (citations omitted). 
[8] We affirm the trial court's summa-
ry judgment in State Farm's claim against 
Bryan. State Farm's subrogation claims 
cannot rise above the claims of the subro-
gees, plaintiffs Hill and Caldwell. Because 
Hill and Caldwell released Bryan from any 
further liability, State Farm is unable to 
pursue its claim against him. Instead, as 
explained above, State Farm's only re-
course is to show either that plaintiffs were 
fully compensated and thus State Farm is 
entitled to be reimbursed from Bryan's in-
surance policy proceeds or that plaintiffs' 
action in releasing Bryan breached the in-
surance policy, and if State Farm shows it 
could have recovered from Bryan, it will be 
entitled to the proceeds as a matter of 
equity. 
Summary judgment in favor of State 
Farm on plaintiffs' complaints and on State 
Farm's counterclaim is reversed. Judg-
ment in favor of Bryan is affirmed. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Plaintiffs1 motion for leave to file first amended complaint 
together with memoranda in support and in opposition to said 
motion were submitted to the court, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code 
of Judicial Administration, for decision. The court having 
reviewed the motion and the memoranda, and being advised in the 
premises, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs1 
motion for leave to file first amended complaint is denied; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter proceed to trial 
and/or other disposition with dispatch as the case is now in its 
seventh year. 
DATED this 7^—day of £sfl. 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorabl 
District 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, on January ex J , 
1990, to the following: 
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff Hill 
and for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff Caldwell was 
heard by the Honorable David S. Young, District Judge, pursuant 
to notice, on March 12, 1990. Glenn C. Hanni of the law firm of 
Strong & Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and V. Anthony 
Vehar of the law firm of Vehar, Beppler, Jacobsen, Lavery & Rose, 
P.C., and Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esquire, appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs. 
; , , : u u , . < . « ^ ' D i l t : « 0 i 
MAR 2 6 1990 
£/»n v V ^ c , j N T Y 
By. :_CE C-'j'yC.erK 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C83-8099 
Judge David s. Young 
The court, having reviewed defendants motion and memoranda, 
plaintiffs' memorandum, having considered oral argument, and 
being advised in the premises, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, FOUND, AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The court finds that since the Supreme Court's decision 
in Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co. 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 
1988), State Farm has paid the $5,510 plus interest to 
plaintiffs. Therefore, the only remaining claims are for bad 
faith and punitive damages. 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff 
Hill is granted on the following grounds: 
(a) Hill's claim for bad faith against defendant is an 
insurance first-party bad faith claim similar to Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Since Hill was not 
in privity of contract with defendant there was no duty owed to 
him by defendant and he has no cause of action for first-party 
insurance bad faith against State Farm; 
(b) Hill has no claim to recover punitive damages against 
State Farm because he has alleged no independent tortious conduct 
against State Farm. No punitive damages may be awarded for a 
claim of first-party insurance bad faith because such claim 
constitutes a contract action, not a tort action. 
2 
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3. Summary judgment dismissing Hill's complaint against 
State Farm should be entered, with prejudice, on the merits, no 
cause of action; 
4. state Farm's motion for partial summary judgment as to 
Caldwell's claim for punitive damages is granted on the grounds 
that Caldwell's complaint against State Farm is for first-party 
insurance bad faith, which is a contract claim, and for which no 
punitive damages may be awarded absent an allegation of 
independent tortious conduct. Caldwell has failed to allege any 
independent tortious conduct against State Farm which would be 
the basis for punitive damages; 
5. Partial summary judgment should be entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff Caldwell dismissing Caldwell's 
claim for punitive damages, with prejudice, on the merits, no 
cause of action; 
6. The court further finds that the issues raised by 
plaintiffs' claims of first-party bad faith against State Farm 
are and have been throughout the pendency of this action fairly 
debatable issues. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of State 
Farm and against plaintiff Hill, and Hill's complaint and all 
claims contained therein against State Farm, are dismissed with 
3 
prejudice, on the merits, no cause of action; 
2. Partial summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
State Farm and against plaintiff Caldwell as to plaintiff 
Caldwell's claims for punitive damages against state Farm, and 
said claims for punitive damages are dismissed with prejudice, on 
the merits, no cause of action. 
DATED this ^yfe^SaY of March, 1990. 
SY THE\COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, on March (4- , 
1990, to the following: 
Roy A. Jacobson, Jr. 
V. Anthony Vehar 
Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose 
P. O. Box 189 
Kemmerer, WY 83101 
Wallace R. Lauchnor 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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ADDENDUM 6 
GLENN C. HANNIf #A1327 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7 080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KENT HILL, Individually 
and as personal representative 
of the heirs of TAMARA ELAINE 
HILL, deceased, and LORIN DEAN 
CALDWELL, Individually and as 
personal representative of the 
heirs of TROY NEIL CALDWELL, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Defendantfs motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the remaining claims of plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually 
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, 
deceased, was filed in April, 1990, along with a memorandum in 
support of that motion. Plaintiff Caldwell failed to file a 
response to defendants motion for summary judgment and memorandum 
in support thereof. Defendant at the time of filing its motion 
for summary judgment and memorandum in support thereof filed a 
request for oral argument. Defendant in May, 1990, served and 
filed a notice to submit for decision. The court finds that the 
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Judge David S. Young 
issues raised by the claims of bad faith against State Farm by 
plaintiff Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually and as personal 
representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, 
are and have been throughout the pendency of this action fairly 
debatable issues. The court having considered the records and 
files of this case including defendant's memorandum in support of 
its motion for summary judgment, and being fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. For the reasons set forth in defendant's memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment, said motion is 
hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff, Lorin Dean Caldwell, individually 
and as personal representative of the heirs of Troy Neil Caldwell, 
deceased, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant's request for oral argument is hereby denied. 
Dated this / fl^" day of June, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
avid S. Y<5ung, J 
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ADDENDUM 7 
August 9, 1982 
Cumis Insurance Company 
1805 Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Gentlemen: 
Re: (Xir Insured: Lorin Caldwell 
Our Claim No: 44 394 365 
Your Insured: L. Farre11 Bryan 
Your Claim No: UA-14200 
Date of Loss: 6-6-82 
We have received the salvage check on our insured vehicle in the amount of 
S190-00, from A-1 National Salvage Yard- There was $160.00 in towing and 
storage. 
Therefore, our net loss was S5,510.00, including our insured's S100.00 
deductible. 
As I explained to you before, the Company has agreed to waive our PIP 
subrogation claim: but we are not willing to waive the collision subroga-
tion claim and request payment of this loss in the amount of $5,510.00. 
Very truly yours. 
L. Clark Davis 
Field Claim Specialist 
LCD:jg 
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ADDENDUM 8 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOO 
Regular October Term, 1988 November 1, 1988 
Robert Kent Hill, individually and 
as personal representative of the 
heirs of Tamara Elaine Hill, 
deceased, and Lorin Dean Caldwell, 
individually and as personal 
representative of the heirs of 
Troy Neil Caldwell, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant. 
REMITTITUR 
No- 20334 & 20391 
District No. C83-8099 
/ 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, 
and the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court 
herein be, and the same is, reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Issued: December 1, 1988 
Record: 2 Volumes 
2 Envelopes 
FILED IN CLFRK'S OFFICE 
o~ > i ni<e f?~v"v*\j Utah 
